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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
James Bentlejewski appeals the District Court’s summary judgment disposing of 
his claims against Werner Enterprises, Inc. for defamation, trade libel, and intentional 
interference with contractual relationships. We will affirm. 
I 
 Bentlejewski worked as a truck driver for Werner from May 2011 until he quit one 
year later. After leaving Werner, Bentlejewski started training as a conditional driver 
associate at Schneider National, Inc. Pursuant to Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) regulations, Schneider requested Bentlejewski’s accident and 
driving history report from Werner. In response, Werner provided Schneider with an 
employment verification that identified four minor accidents involving Bentlejewski 
during his employment with Werner, and classified each accident as “prevent[able].” 
App. 241. By email dated May 25, 2012, Schneider told Bentlejewski that he would not 
be considered for a driving position. 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Nearly a year later, in March 2013, Bentlejewski began probationary employment 
with Vitran Express, Inc. Vitran requested Bentlejewski’s accident and driving history 
report from Werner pursuant to FMCSA regulations. In June 2013, Werner provided 
Vitran with an employment verification that again identified the same four 
“prevent[able]” minor accidents. Two days later, Vitran notified Bentlejewski that his 
probationary employment would not be continued. 
 Bentlejewski filed a complaint in September 2013, alleging that the employment 
verifications that Werner provided Schneider and Vitran contained false and misleading 
information. After discovery, the District Court granted Werner’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that Werner published information about Bentlejewski’s driving record 
subject to a conditional privilege and Bentlejewski failed to defeat that privilege. The 
Court also found that Bentlejewski failed to show that Werner acted improperly in 
providing information to Bentlejewski’s prospective employers. This timely appeal 
followed. 
II 
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary. EEOC v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 2015). We will affirm if the moving party establishes 
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Neither party challenges the District 
Court’s decision to apply Pennsylvania law. 
A 
 There is no dispute that Werner’s submissions of the employment verifications to 
Bentlejewski’s prospective employers were conditionally privileged under both 
Pennsylvania and federal law. See Grogan v. Duane, Morris & Heckscher, 1991 WL 
98888, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1991) (“Under Pennsylvania law, a conditional privilege 
applies when a prior employer provides an evaluation of a former employee to a 
prospective employer.” (citing Zuschek v. Whitmoyer Labs., Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 
(E.D. Pa. 1977))); 49 U.S.C. § 508(a) (protecting those who provide information about a 
driver’s safety performance history from defamation, invasion of privacy, and 
interference with contract actions); 49 C.F.R. § 391.23(l) (same). Thus, to maintain a 
claim for defamation, Bentlejewski had to prove abuse of the privilege. 
 In evaluating whether Werner abused its privilege, the District Court applied an 
“actual malice” standard under Pennsylvania law. In other words, Bentlejewski needed to 
show that Werner intentionally included false information on his employment 
verifications or did so with reckless disregard for the truth to defeat the conditional 
privilege. On appeal, both parties agree that Pennsylvania law requires only a showing of 
negligence. See Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 400 
(Pa. 2007). This error by the District Court is unavailing to Bentlejewski, however, 
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because the Pennsylvania negligence standard is preempted by federal transportation law. 
See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 1591, 1594–95 (2015) (explaining conflict preemption); 49 U.S.C. § 508(c) (expressly 
preempting state law).  
 Federal law specifically protects employers against defamation and interference 
with contract actions when they provide information about a driver’s safety performance 
history. 49 U.S.C. § 508(a); see 49 C.F.R. § 391.23(l)(1)(ii). These protections do not 
apply, however, “to persons who knowingly furnish false information.” 49 U.S.C. 
§ 508(b)(3) (emphasis added); see 49 C.F.R. § 391.23(l)(2) (same). The District Court 
focused on whether Werner knowingly furnished false information, and thus its use of the 
words “actual malice” was harmless. 
 Turning to the question of whether Werner abused its privilege, Bentlejewski 
argues that the employment verifications contained false information regarding three of 
the four accidents. Bentlejewski’s evidence does not support that conclusion, even under 
the deferential summary judgment standard. He signed accident review reports admitting 
the facts regarding two of the three accidents at issue and has not offered any evidence to 
counter those initial findings, which were later confirmed by Werner’s Safety Director. 
During his deposition, Bentlejewski admitted that he had no evidence other than his own 
recollections. And although Bentlejewski initially contested the third accident, he 
produced no evidence except for an inconclusive video. This was insufficient to show that 
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Werner knowingly submitted false information regarding these accidents. In sum, 
Bentlejewski did not show that Werner provided false information, knowingly or 
otherwise, regarding his driving record. 
B 
 Bentlejewski next argues that the District Court erred when it granted Werner 
summary judgment on his claim of intentional interference with contractual relationships. 
This claim fails for largely the same reason his defamation claim failed, namely for want 
of evidence to support the notion that Werner knowingly provided any false information 
or otherwise acted improperly in providing the employment verifications to Schneider and 
Vitran. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 508(a)–(b); 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.23(l)(1)–(2); Walnut St. Assocs., 
Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 982 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (requiring “proof 
that the defendant’s actions were improper under the circumstances presented” to 
overcome privilege for sharing information). 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
